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ABSTRACT: A sociology of human rights sounds almost like a contradiction in terms. Sociology is about social 
groups, about particular experiences, about how people, embedded in space and time, make sense of their lives and 
give meaning to their world. It deals with power and interest and the social bases of our experiences. On the other 
hand, human rights are about human beings in general, without temporal or spatial references, not about groups and 
their boundaries. Human rights are about humanity, located in the world and connected to an inviolable nature. 
Global media representations, among others, create new cosmopolitan memories, providing new epistemological 
vantage points and emerging moral-political interdependencies. As such, memories of the Holocaust contribute to 
the creation of a common European cultural memory based on the abstract notion of human rights. Sociologically, a 
theory of human rights has to show how universal and particular memories co-exist, are reconciled etc. and what it 
means for the recognition of the “other”, and the broadening of circles of solidarity.
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RESUMEN: Recordando una sociología de los derechos humanos.- Una sociología de los derechos humans suena 
casi como un oxímoron. La sociología se fija en los grupos sociales, en las experiencias particulares, y en cómo las 
personas, marcadas por el espacio y el tiempo, dan sentido a sus vidas y atribuyen un significado al mundo. Trata del 
poder, el interés y la base social de nuestras experiencias. Contrariamente, los derechos humanos se refieren a huma-
nos en general, sin referencias temporales ni espaciales, y no a grupos y sus límites. Los derechos humanos tratan de 
la humanidad, ubicado en el mundo y conectado con su naturaleza inviolable. Representaciones mediáticas globales, 
entre otras, crean memorias cosmopólitas nuevas, disponiendo nuevos puntos de vista epistemológicos y interdepen-
dencias morales-políticas emergentes. Así, las memorias del Holocausto contribuyen a la creación de una memoria 
cultural europea común, basada en las nociones abstractas de los derechos humanos. Sociológicamente, una teoría de 
los derechos humanos tiene que mostrar cómo las memorias universales y particulares coexisten, se reconcilian etc. 
y qué significan para el reconocimiento del “otro” y la ampliación de los círculos de solidaridad. 
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THE TENSiON BETWEEN SOCiOLOgY  
AND HUMAN RigHTS 
A sociology of human rights sounds almost like a con-
tradiction in terms. Sociology is about social groups, 
about particular experiences, about how people, embed-
ded in space and time, make sense of their lives and give 
meaning to their world. It deals with power and interest 
and the social bases of our experiences. On the other 
hand, human rights are about human beings in general, 
without temporal or spatial references, not about groups 
and their boundaries. Human rights are about humanity, 
located in the world and connected to an inviolable na-
ture. Rights and dignity come together and they travel 
without any kind of sociological clothing. Human rights 
have turned into questions of belief and contain the aura 
of the sacred. It is, therefore, a challenge to construct a 
sociological analysis of human rights without reducing 
them to power struggles or the politics of interest. 
To avoid, what we think is a misleading dichotomy, 
we demonstrate how, once institutionalized, human rights 
norms themselves constitute political interests shaping 
power balances and the relationship between universal 
identifications and particular identities. Our central claim 
is that the social embeddedness of human rights is con-
nected to memories of catastrophes, more specifically, the 
changing representations of the extermination of the Jew-
ish people during the Holocaust. It was this particular ex-
perience that became the universal mirror onto which the 
precarious vulnerability of human beings has been pro-
jected. Our sociology of human rights shows how this 
universalization operates through different forms of re-
membrance. Through the analytic prism of historical 
memories –which refers to shared understandings specific 
pasts carry for present concerns of a political communi-
ty– we provide an explanation for both the salience of hu-
man rights norms as a globally available repertoire of le-
gitimate claim making and the persistence of particular 
identities. Paradoxically, as we will show, when memo-
ries of the Holocaust become enshrined in commemora-
tive practices treating them as the paradigmatic violation 
of human rights, it is likely to reinforce a split between 
universal and particular modes of identification. 
An early attempt to construct a sociology of human 
rights that recognizes the precarious relationship of par-
ticular (i.e. national) citizenship and universal (i.e. glob-
al) human rights can be found in Hannah Arendt’s The 
Origins of Totalitarianism. Published in 1951, the book 
was written under the impact of the Jewish catastrophe 
several years earlier. In a chapter entitled “The Perplexi-
ties of the Rights of Men”, Arendt reflects on the particu-
lar Jewish experience of political homelessness and ends 
her criticism with a reflection on universal human and 
citizen rights. Looking from the Jewish experience inside 
out, she addresses one of the key questions of our times: 
questions of minorities and citizenship. On the one hand, 
she sees the constant constitution of ever new minorities 
in ethnically homogenous nation-states and therefore, cit-
izenship based on nationality as an ever widening gap of 
a universal claim to humanity and human rights. Arendt 
leans on Edmund Burke who had nothing but ridicule for 
abstract human rights, privileging the rights of English-
men. For Arendt this means that without institutional and 
state protection, universal rights are just empty words, na-
ked like human beings without citizenship and state pro-
tection. Men cannot appeal to other men as men, but only 
as members of communities. This is her sociological in-
sight into the abstractedness of human rights (Ignatieff, 
2001). Her interest in the Jewish fate in modernity was 
also a measuring stick for the fate of man in modernity as 
such. Arendt exposed the limits of an abstract universal-
ism, pointing to the necessity to embed and endow human 
rights with institutional powers. The dilemma that Arendt 
directs our attention to circumscribes the dilemma of a 
social theory of human rights. It is the dilemma between 
the sincerity of the declarations that human beings are en-
dowed with universal human rights and the situation of 
the rightless themselves. “Abstract”, “universal” and “hu-
man” are therefore empty terms in a world where people 
are being deprived of the protection of the state. Arendt 
brought the problem of human rights back to its political 
backbone: enforcement. And enforcement is about the so-
cial and political foundations of human rights and not 
about power interests alone (Isaac, 1996, 2002). 
The foundations of human rights have changed con-
siderably since the end of the Cold War and in the context 
of global interdependencies. During the last six decades 
numerous challenges to the particularistic presupposi-
tions that inform the dispensation of rights based on na-
tional belonging have been observed. “With the erosion 
of national citizenship, Marshall’s three forms of rights 
(legal, political and social) have been augmented by 
rights that are global, namely environmental, aboriginal 
and cultural rights” (Turner, 2001: 189). Human rights as 
a global issue are, of course, not a new phenomenon. Its 
origins can be traced back to the late 18th century and the 
international formalization starting in the late 19th centu-
ry. Its beginnings are “marked by attempts to extend the 
processes of delimiting public power to the international 
sphere, and by attempts thereafter to transform the mean-
ing of legitimate political authority from effective control 
to the maintenance of basic standards or values, which no 
political agent, whether a representative of a government 
or state, should, in principle, be able to abrogate” (Held, 
2003: 165). Elsewhere we have examined the impact of 
the Human Rights Regime on the transformation of state 
sovereignty (Levy and Sznaider, 2006). Suffice to say 
here that aggressive militarism has been replaced by a 
codification and legal standardization of warfare. The rea-
son for this is partly because the sanctity of the nation 
state has been lifted and both individuals and (ethnic) mi-
norities have obtained a stronger legal status under the 
aegis of transnational jurisdiction. The modern Human 
Rights Regime is premised on the notion that the preven-
tion of human suffering takes precedence over the princi-
ple of sovereignty (Dunne and Wheeler, 1999; Ignatieff, 
2001) even if that prevention of suffering may clash with 
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the state’s calling of providing security for its citizens 
alone. 
This “human rights turn” and the concomitant trans-
formation of nation-state sovereignty, we suggest, raises 
new questions about the Hobbesian quid pro quo of free-
dom and protection. Following Hobbes, people’s appre-
ciation of the security the state can provide is a direct 
function of how insecure they feel. Fear of violent death 
and the desire for self-preservation lead to the acceptance 
of the Leviathan as the ultimate protector, essentially pro-
viding the reasoning behind the legitimacy of modern 
state sovereignty. The Human Rights Regime too seeks to 
liberate us from the fear of violent death. Both, the Levia-
than and the legitimating power of the Human Rights Re-
gime are predicated on their ability to inspire a fear of 
punishment and violation. Hobbes accomplishes this with 
references to a “state of nature” that is characterized by 
anarchy and a war of all against all. It conjures up an im-
agery of “violent death”, that ultimately explains the del-
egation of legitimate authority to the state in return for 
protection. While Hobbes’ state of nature is a pre-histori-
cal construct and asks of people to forget their desire for 
immortality, memories of the Holocaust function as the 
historical reference point for what happens when states 
turn from being protectors to violators. Here people are 
not only mortal but can be disposed of at the will of a 
brutal and sovereign state.
The prevalence of memories of state sponsored hu-
man rights violations and their legal inscription in the 
global age are challenging the foundational Hobbesian 
contract. The Holocaust underscores that the state does 
not provide security and in some cases the Leviathan can 
become the biggest executioner of them all. People obey 
the state because of a fear of violent death that supersedes 
the fear of the state. After 1945, at least in the European 
context, memories of chaos and civil war and the constant 
fear of the potential for violent death have become the 
source for shifting some legitimacy to nation-transcend-
ing, i.e. human rights principles. Alternative conceptions 
of (citizenship) rights have emerged that challenge the 
national premises of solidarity, long cultivated through 
memories of war and blood. It has been replaced by the 
global market, consumption and mutual indifference 
(Sznaider, 2000).
Elsewhere we have described the ascendance of a Hu-
man Rights Regime as a Leviathan writ large (Levy and 
Sznaider, 2004). Unlike Hobbes’ imaginary state of na-
ture, the human rights narrative is based on concrete his-
torical references. But like Hobbes, it ultimately tilts to-
ward an abstract historical scenario that is less about the 
actual abuses than about a new illusion of protection. 
There is no “space” for “barbarous acts” to be treated as 
“normal” occurrences and become part, of say, the daily 
news. Here the commemoration of the Holocaust as a 
universal code for human rights abuses ultimately is 
about forgetting the particular experience and redirecting 
the focus on symbolic, political and cultural practices that 
underscore the “solution” offered by the Human Rights 
Regime rather than engaging with the “problem” in con-
crete fashion. Here too, it is the unbearable coping with 
particular forms of violations and violence that has to 
make room for our desire for security and protection. In 
other words, the politics of memory assumes a similar a-
historical dimension that Hobbes’ state of nature is predi-
cated on. 
It is this fragile contract that explains the conditional-
ity of the Human Rights Regime. The transformations of 
warfare and terrorism, among other things, can explain 
these new developments and throws the state back to its 
founding moment: the provision of security for its citi-
zens. As we will show in our concluding section, new se-
curity threats, the breakdown of states and other develop-
ments operate as stark reminders for the precarious nature 
of the Human Rights Regime. In what follows we specify 
the conditions under which the balance between particu-
lar identities and universal identifications is shaped. By 
extension the salience of human rights norms is a func-
tion of how abstract memories of violations and particular 
memories, as well as fears of violent death, are contend-
ing with each other.
THEORiziNg HUMAN RigHTS
Does this dichotomy ultimately mean that a social 
analysis of human rights is a contradiction in terms? Is 
that the reason that by and large, sociologists have avoid-
ed the subject of human rights in theoretical terms? A 
brief and schematic look at the causes of this lacuna is 
instructive. In general terms, sociological thinking coun-
ters the belief that politics should be guided by theoretical 
doctrine and universal principles and appeals to abstract 
rights. On the other hand, it is exactly this kind of meta-
physical zeal rejected by sociological thinking, which is 
at the heart of the contemporary project for a global Hu-
man Rights Regime. The conceptual dearth is, primarily, 
the result of the national caging that coincided with the 
birth of sociology and remains the hallmark of social the-
ory. This national focus is compounded by the aforemen-
tioned Hobbesian social contract between a collectivity 
and a sovereign. Since the protection of a particular com-
munity has primacy, there is little conceptual and political 
space left for a nation-transcending universal approach. 
One could even argue that this national container is en-
demic to the broader sociological enterprise. Sociology is 
about exclusion and inclusions, i.e. about social groups 
and solidarity of which the nation is a prominent catego-
ry. As such, it is mainly about the definition of group 
boundaries, with manifestations such as communitarian-
ism and ethno-nationalism on the far end. In contrast, hu-
man rights are about the breakdown and abolishment of 
boundaries. It is about humans and not about embedded 
people in communities. It suggests a cosmopolitan soli-
darity not based on communal allegiance. 
In the history of political thought, it is the difference 
between Kant and Rousseau. A universal Human Rights 
Regime is no longer the “General Will” of modern de-
mocracy, as mapped by Rousseau onto the nation and wo-
ven into the sociological theories of Durkheim and We-
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ber. Rousseau’s General Will was not only the foundation 
of modern relativism; it is also the source for the modern 
idea of the nation not merely as a collection of followers, 
but as the institution that reconciled freedom and deter-
minism. It was the birth of society as national society. In 
the course of the 20th century, the “general” has become 
synonymous with the universal, and that universal is 
largely considered to be the nation. This is how methodo-
logical nationalism and universalism are tied up in socio-
logical theory, excluding the universality of human rights 
from its consideration and pushed into the realm of nor-
mative philosophical analysis. 
Furthermore, “the analysis of human rights presents a 
problem for sociology, in which cultural relativism and the 
fact-value distinction have largely destroyed the classical 
tradition of the natural-law basis for rights discourse” 
(Turner, 1993: 489). Sociology is about causality and 
about historicism. Natural law is the opposite by claiming 
that there is a firm foundation in nature for rights and that 
they are not subject to choice (Strauss, 1955). Another ten-
sion revolves around the notion that sociology is about in-
terests (material and ideal), whereas human rights, at least 
in its self-presentation, are universal and void of particular 
interests. This disparity is often rearticulated when sociol-
ogists seek to debunk the universality of human rights by 
referring to it as a new form of imperialism and a threat to 
particular cultural values (Chomsky, 2005; Evans, 2001; 
Waters, 1996). Lastly, as we shall illustrate in a section ad-
dressing a “clash of memories”, the incorporation of the 
universal (and unconditional) essence of human rights into 
this national cage is frequently circumscribed by a host of 
conditions that involve contentious relations. Especially 
violent conflicts raising levels of threats and fears tend to 
reinforce the centrality of the Leviathan and the protection 
of a particular community.
Given the prevalence of national assumptions that in-
form most conceptualizations of (citizenship) rights, a so-
cial theory of human rights beyond the national container 
has yet to be constructed. Bryan Turner’s pioneering work 
on human rights (1993, 1997, 2006) is an important step in 
this direction. According to Turner, “vulnerability defines 
our humanity and is presented here as the common basis 
of human rights” (2006: 1). Our ontological security, ne-
gated through our awareness of universal human frailty, is 
a major causal factor for the increasing dominance of hu-
man rights consciousness. However, this hardly suffices to 
ensure the equal enforcement of such broadly defined 
rights. They require social institutions, which themselves 
are “fragile and precarious, and there is a complex interac-
tion between our human frailty, institution building, and 
political or state power” (Turner, 2006: 1). Turner recog-
nizes that the balance between universal and particular 
commitments can, but need not necessarily be mutually 
exclusive. He argues “that the protection offered by na-
tion-states and national citizenship is declining, and yet 
the state and citizenship remain important for the enforce-
ment of both social and human rights” (Turner, 2006: 2). 
Realizing the impact of globalization, Turner suggests a 
sociology of rights that concedes the limitations of bound-
ed citizenship conceptions. Social rights of nation-states 
are being replaced or augmented by human rights answer-
ing to new global conditions (Soysal, 1994). Vulnerability 
becomes in this view the new global condition mediated 
by constant access to the sights of suffering people across 
the world (Boltanski, 1999; Tester, 1999). People become 
witnesses to human rights violations. If human rights 
come to be understood as violations of rights based on the 
commonness of our vulnerability people will “feel” that 
they are defending the foundations of their own vulnerable 
identities when they defend the importance of human 
rights for foreigners and strangers. The cultural and politi-
cal diversity that is essential to this kind of life has been 
slowly elevated to a central political norm. It sometimes 
seems as if it were even more highly valued than the par-
ticular principle of exclusivity with which it now shares 
conceptual and political space. 
This relates to a central debate in political theory: the 
human rights versus popular sovereignty split (Benhabib, 
2006). Rather than addressing them as mutually exclusive 
categories, we have sociologized this tension by showing 
how the adherence to human rights has become a core le-
gitimating principle of sovereignty itself (Levy and 
Sznaider, 2006). The normative orientation of political 
theorists seeks to mediate between democracy (popular 
sovereignty) and liberalism (human rights). Though this 
mediation, beyond the theoretical claim that the combina-
tion of it is rational and therefore universally valid 
(Habermas, 2006), remains problematic in practice. Ra-
tionality, be it as a foundational or communicative cate-
gory, even if enjoying a growing diffusion, also entails a 
reaction that denies its primacy. Fundamentalism, after 
all, is not an anachronism or a return to an imagined past, 
but largely a modern and increasingly global reaction to 
the success of rationality. Turner’s move from spirit to 
body is a sociological attempt to get out of this intellec-
tual quagmire. 
MEMORiES Of HUMAN RigHTS
In this essay we expand on Turner’s theory by sug-
gesting a focus on, how memories of human rights abuses 
and failures to address them have shaped both the forma-
tion of a universal Human Rights Regime and the recon-
figuration of particular identities and state practices. Our 
mnemonic approach provides a conceptual framework for 
examining the balance between universal identifications 
and particular identities in a global context. Rather than 
treating the universal and particular as mutually exclusive 
categories either politically or morally, we suggest that 
they are intricately (and inevitably) linked. Both the uni-
versal and the particular are social categories. Through 
the analytic prism of memories of rights abuses we pro-
vide an explanation for the salience of human rights 
norms as a globally available repertoire of legitimate 
claim making. Public negotiations about memories of 
failures to address past human rights abuses (e.g. legisla-
tive measures, historical revisionism, educational meas-
ures, and commemorative practices) reveal the balance of 
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particular and universal identifications. Tracing public 
controversies about human rights abuses and their com-
memorative expressions during the last six decades, we 
demonstrate how this awareness about bodily frailty and 
its concomitant institutionalization into a Human Rights 
Regime is mediated by who remembers what and how 
memories of past abuses change. At the same time, we 
show how this process is continuously challenged by a set 
of competing values in which universal and particular 
memories vie for normative primacy.
Accounting for the global context and the interaction 
with the local (i.e. national) within which negotiations 
about memories are shaped nowadays, we propose a cos-
mopolitan methodology (Beck and Sznaider, 2006). 
Methodological cosmopolitanism points to a new re-
search program that, first and foremost, aims to overcome 
the aforementioned methodological nationalism (Beck, 
2002). It establishes a kind of “methodological scepti-
cism” as a vector of research for opening up concepts and 
methodological principles of modern sociology, most no-
tably regarding the nation-state as the axiomatic unit of 
analysis. Furthermore, methodological cosmopolitanism 
challenges a series of modernist dualisms, while provid-
ing interactive mechanisms for analysing the balance of 
the universal and the particular. In fact, cosmopolitan 
methodology defines cosmopolitanization itself as made 
up of the continuous dialectic between the local and the 
global. In this sense, it not only implies the recognition of 
both endogenous and exogenous factors, but also ac-
knowledges that it is the interaction between the two, 
rather than just the internalization of exogenous pres-
sures, which produces new meaningful frameworks.
Accordingly, cosmopolitan memories refer to practic-
es that shift attention away from the territorialized nation-
state framework, which is commonly associated with the 
notion of collective memory (Levy and Sznaider, 2001, 
2005). Rather than presuppose the congruity of nation, 
territory and polity, cosmopolitan memories are based on 
and contribute to nation-transcending idioms, spanning 
territorial and national borders. The classical concept of 
collective memory is group and nation bound (Hal-
bwachs, 1980). We argue that this “national and group 
container” is slowly being cracked. Whereas universalism 
frequently implies the dissolution of the particular, the 
cosmopolitan gaze provides an analytic lens that shows 
how particular national and ethnic memories are not 
erased but transformed. Conceptually speaking then, cos-
mopolitan memories provide a crucial resource for ex-
plaining the significance of human rights norms as a glob-
ally available political repertoire as well as shaping the 
practices through which the balance between universal 
and particular identifications are negotiated. 
Our cosmopolitan methodology approaches the no-
tion of an international convergence of rights policies and 
universalization with some reservations. For one, it is im-
portant to distinguish our cosmopolitan approach from 
the strong international impulses that contributed to the 
original institutional manifestations of human rights at 
the end of the 19th century. Lasting until the beginning of 
World War II, this period witnessed a significant growth 
in international organizations and laws dedicated to hu-
man rights. It should be pointed out, though, that this in-
ternationalist era was primarily geared toward the con-
solidation of nation-state sovereignty. In contrast, the 
cosmopolitanization of the last two decades indicates a 
re-casting of the state-society-nation relationship. While 
the “old internationalism” regulated the relations between 
nation-states and sanctified their particularism, the “new 
cosmopolitanism” challenges the primacy of the nation 
and emphasizes the universal foundations of global 
interdependencies. 
Our mnemographic approach serves as another cor-
rective to expectations of convergence. Structural simi-
larities do not necessarily determine the meanings at-
tached to human rights norms in particular national 
contexts. As we have pointed out above, cosmopolitan 
memories co-exist with memories of communal losses 
and traumata. In our discussion section below, we show 
how reactions against the very universality of human 
rights have become an important feature of how particu-
lar identities are being negotiated. Thus, rather than treat-
ing national sentiments and other expressions of particu-
lar identification as anachronistic, we show how they are 
addressed in a new context of global interdependencies 
and related “clashes of memories”. Collectivities remem-
ber their vulnerabilities in different ways, diachronically 
but also cross-culturally. In light of such dis-simultanei-
ties, antagonisms persist and depending on resulting 
threats and fears, they cannot be reconciled with recourse 
to rationality or universality. In short, a plurality of mem-
ories about human frailty and accompanying rights are 
constitutive for the political and cultural salience of hu-
man rights. And a theory of human rights must reckon 
with these plural and sometimes fragmented memories. 
Such a theory is not only about convergence and univer-
salism, but also about differences expressed in communal 
memories and continuing antagonisms. However, in con-
trast to the first half of the 20th century and until the dis-
solution of the bi-polar world, these tensions and the ac-
companying clashes of memories now unfold on the 
background of a cosmopolitan ideal that, while most 
prominent in Europe, has become a global norm against 
which particularism is articulated.
Cosmopolitan memories then shape the balance be-
tween universal and particular rights discourses in the 
context of numerous processes: One refers to the political 
will of states to engage with memories of rights abuses 
and the extent to which it is becoming a prerequisite for 
their legitimate standing in the international community 
and increasingly also a domestic source of legitimacy. Op-
erating with neo-institutionalist assumptions, the world 
society approach demonstrates how global norms become 
internalized and assume modular capacities, circumscrib-
ing the activities of national policy makers (Meyer et al., 
1997; Boli and Thomas, 1997). Accordingly, the Human 
Rights Regime creates isomorphic pressures on nation-
states leading them to join international human rights trea-
ties (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005). Two, in democrat-
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ic countries, the violation of human rights has frequently 
mobilized significant opposition and incurred political 
costs. Another source of friction between the particular 
and the universal relates to the aforementioned Hobbesian 
contract, informing the balance of state-security and soci-
ety. Three, legal inscriptions of memories of human rights 
abuses do recast the underpinnings of International Law 
itself and also constitute significant precedents for the cos-
mopolitanization of national jurisdiction. Elsewhere we 
have examined the development of a new global legalism 
driven by human rights norms and its implication for the 
reconfiguration of sovereignty (Levy and Sznaider, 2006). 
As we will illustrate in our final discussion section, 
this tenuous relationship is often the result of political 
contingencies. However, we argue, that this tension is not 
merely epiphenomenal, but integral to how memories of 
human rights operate. The salience of universal (human) 
or particular (national) rights is mediated by, among other 
things, the extent to which memories of past human rights 
abuses are transmitted as concrete or abstract forms, the 
latter proliferating with the cosmopolitanization of mem-
ories. Human rights matter only to the extent that their 
universality is recognized. This recognition, in turn, is 
predicated on a process of de-contextualization by which 
memories of concrete (particular) atrocities are trans-
formed into abstract (universal) violations of humanity. 
Without this de-contextualization it is difficult to re-con-
textualize memories of human rights as abstract catego-
ries and thus ensure their recognition as universal lessons 
for humanity. 
Moreover, this process of abstraction does little to 
change the fact that communities carry different memo-
ries of the past, based largely on the extent to which 
memories of past abuses are a concrete part of shared ex-
periences or whether they are lacking the kind of proxim-
ity that allow them to become abstract principles. Accord-
ingly, the strength of human rights principles in a given 
national context is the product of the tenuous balance of 
particular (concrete) and universal (de-contextualized) 
memories. The latter are in essence a form of forgetting. 
The relationship of memory and forgetting has received 
significant attention in literature (Ricoeur, 1999). How-
ever, contrary to most views, we are not treating memory 
as an antidote to forgetting. Nor are we merely saying that 
memory can facilitate forgetting or that they are two sides 
of the same coin. Instead, we are suggesting that institu-
tionalized memories of human rights abuses, inexorably 
implies forgetting. The institutionalization of such memo-
ries and thus their ability to mobilize legitimate political 
claims is largely based on the aforementioned process of 
de-contextualization, which in turn requires a shift from 
concrete memories to abstract remembrance. That is, a 
move away from the concrete (i.e. particular) experience 
toward a more abstract (i.e. universal) message. Conse-
quently, we observe a shift consisting of the institutionali-
zation of the remembrance of barbarous acts at the ex-
pense of memories of the barbarity of the acts. 
The distinction between memory and remembrance 
then is not incidental. Nor can it be reduced to the so-
called instrumentalization of memories. Memory vacillat-
ing between the concrete and the abstract, and the implied 
de-contextualization, can be related to three dimensions. 
It inheres in the course of action that gives memories their 
ritualistic strength. Ritualization depends on mediation, 
which by definition requires a certain form of abstraction. 
Considering the various media through which memories 
of past human abuses are communicated, we consider this 
to be a process of mediated forgetting. Failure to remem-
ber is also implied insofar as proximity to that which is 
remembered will shape the relative political-cultural sig-
nificance it carries for a community. Put differently, the 
universality of human rights necessitates a certain dis-
tance from the actual events that are being remembered. 
Lastly, the immanence of this dynamic is not just the 
product of historical and geographic proximity, but also 
the result of temporal distance to the events that are being 
remembered. This temporal distance is captured in Jan 
Assmann’s distinction between communicative and cul-
tural memory (Assmann, 1991). Communicative memory 
refers to memory based on group-specific carriers and is 
expressed through the daily encounter and stories of peo-
ple involved in the events that are being remembered. 
Cultural memory exists independent of its carriers and is 
reproduced through media and commemorative institu-
tions. “What is at stake, is the transformation of commu-
nicative, i.e. lived and in witnesses embodied memory, 
into cultural, i.e. institutionally shaped and sustained 
memory, that is, into ‘cultural mnemotechnique’” (Ass-
mann, 1991: 343). This transition corresponds to our ar-
gument about the inevitable shift from the concrete to the 
abstract. Cultural memory turns history into narrative and 
shifts attention from fact-driven (i.e. particular) history to 
remembered history (i.e. produced through ritualization 
and other forms of representation). 
This nexus of time changes and the need for representa-
tional mechanisms is also acknowledged in the work of the 
French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, a foundational fig-
ure in the field of collective memory studies. Halbwachs 
(1980) makes a distinction between social memory and 
historical memory. Social memory is the memory of things 
both that one has experienced personally, and that the 
group that one is a part of has experienced. It is history be-
fore it becomes history: the present experienced through a 
group and then remembered. Historical memory, on the 
other hand, is mediated like Assmann’s conception of cul-
tural memory by films and books and schools and holidays. 
These analytic distinctions underscore the difference be-
tween memory and remembrance, on the one, and the con-
comitant process of abstraction, on the other. 
CLASH Of MEMORiES
One way of looking at this phenomenon empirically is 
to focus on the de-contextualization of memories of hu-
man rights abuses, which functions as a prerequisite for 
the spread of human rights as a universally recognized 
idiom. The de-contextualization of particular memories 
of human rights abuses and their universal re-appropria-
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tion can be addressed by distinguishing between “who” is 
remembering and “what” is remembered. Moreover, cos-
mopolitan memories of human rights abuses are circum-
scribed by the historical occurrence of a forgiveness nar-
rative that has further contributed to the shift from 
memory to remembrance and a corresponding transition 
from concrete individual to more abstract collective di-
mensions. Memories of human rights violations have be-
come a subject of public negotiations and subjected to the 
imperatives of forgiveness and reconciliation.
We would like to briefly illustrate these dynamics by 
looking at how changing memories of the Holocaust have 
played a seminal role for the emergence of a human rights 
discourse. Elsewhere we have focused on the historical 
dimensions of this process (Levy and Sznaider, 2004, 
2006). Here our intent is more conceptual, as we examine 
how changing perceptions of Holocaust memory are con-
tributing to the abstraction that inheres in the uncondi-
tional demands of human rights claims. A first inclination 
would be to ask whether the Holocaust can be remem-
bered outside the ethnic and national boundaries of the 
Jewish victims and the German perpetrators. A closer 
look reveals that this particular relationship has been 
transposed into a universal discourse where historical 
memories are the main mechanism through which partic-
ular experiences are being universalized and ultimately 
de-historicized. This also involves different questions for 
the future of those remembering groups. When the Holo-
caust is remembered within the ethnic boundaries of its 
Jewish victims, the question which is asked is “Why did 
this happen to us” and the frame of reference is anti-Sem-
itism. When the Holocaust is commemorated outside the 
victim group, the central question is “How could it hap-
pen at all” and is framed with general references to rac-
ism and genocidal practices. It is precisely the abstract 
nature of “good and evil” that symbolizes the Holocaust, 
which contributes to the extra-territorial and ultimately 
de-contextualized quality of cosmopolitan memory, thus 
setting the stage for abstraction.2 
Paradoxically, this process of de-contextualization has 
its origins in a setting that was actually the first opportunity 
to offer detailed insights into the murderous details of the 
German extermination machine, namely the War Crime 
Tribunals of the Allied Forces against former Nazis. To-
gether with the UN Conventions of Human Rights and 
Genocide at the end of the 1940s, they sat the stage for 
rendering a particular historical event into a universal code 
(Alexander, 2002). It was the American understanding of 
the Holocaust, which framed the Nuremberg Trials, which 
de-emphasized the particular experience of Jewish victims: 
Nazi war crimes happened to 60 million people, among 
them 6 million Jews. During the Nuremberg trials, the Hol-
ocaust appeared as a set of facts but not yet as an idea. But, 
surprisingly perhaps, all the essential facts were there from 
the beginning, starting with the estimate that 5.7 million 
Jews had been killed by an intentional plan of the Nazi 
high command. There was also visual evidence when the 
film The Nazi Concentration Camps was screened, provid-
ing one of the most dramatic moments in the trial. But the 
crimes against the Jews took up a tiny percentage of the 
total Nuremberg indictment, and the Jews themselves re-
mained abstract victims. Thus, for example, no victims 
were testifying on their behalf. Yet, even if the Holocaust 
and the fate of the Jews remained a neglected aspect of the 
Nuremberg trial, it did provide the backdrop for its univer-
salistic message. The realization of the horrors of the Nazi 
atrocities and the Holocaust informed the scope of univer-
sal human rights jurisdiction. The struggle at Nuremberg 
was conceived as one between civilization and barbarism. 
Civilization was the victim, Nazi barbarism the perpetrator. 
And this is how we initially got from the Holocaust to the 
concepts of “humanity” and of “crimes” against them. The 
Jews were there, but they were standing in for “humanity 
as a whole”. 
It is against a background of particular national narra-
tives and the normative universal imperative of reconcili-
ation as response to human rights violations, that the du-
alism between victim and perpetrator memories is 
organized and ultimately fades. The vanishing of concrete 
personal memories is accelerated through the Americani-
zation of Holocaust representations.3 As a result, we ob-
serve the displacement of the dichotomy of perpetrators 
and victims and the appearance of a third epistemological 
vantage point: that of the passive by-stander and an atten-
dant witness perspective. 
This abstraction is also the prerequisite for its legal 
inscription into a principal conception of International 
Law. Tensions between individuality and collectivity are 
mirrored in the emerging legislative language of interna-
tional law, especially pertaining to crimes against human-
ity (Levy and Sznaider, 2006). The individual autonomy 
is taken away from victims of genocide and other atroci-
ties where people are targeted because of their group (i.e. 
not individual) characteristics. Ironically, subsequent at-
tempts to redeem their individuality also involve a collec-
tive approach (i.e. class action suits which place the em-
phasis on that which is collective and categorical). This in 
turn leads to the recognition of the individual and the ab-
straction of the crimes and the ensuing processes. 
At this point, the Holocaust has been reconfigured as a 
de-contextualized event. Memories of the Holocaust shape 
the articulation of a new rights culture. Once this new 
rights culture is in place, it no longer needs to rely on its 
original articulation (in this case the memory of the Holo-
caust) but it assumes strong normative powers. Holocaust 
memory and the new rights culture are, in other words, 
mutually constitutive. To be sure, this is not by necessity 
but is the result of particular historical conjunctures (the 
end of the Cold War, the Balkan wars of the 1990s, as well 
as the repeated failures of this new Human Rights Regime 
to prevent acts of ethnic cleansing and genocide). The 
term Holocaust has passed from an abstract universal, to a 
set of very particularistic and/or national meanings, back 
to what we have elsewhere referred to as cosmopolitan 
memories. The Holocaust is now a concept that has been 
dislocated from space and time precisely because it can be 
used to dramatize any act of injustice, racism, or crime 
perpetrated anywhere on the planet.
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THE RETURN Of THE NEW LEViATHAN 
If the early 1990s gave rise to a surge in both the insti-
tutionalization of a Human Rights Regime and academic 
attention to it, by the end of the millennium, and even 
more so after September 11, 2001, human rights were 
perceived to be in a crisis (Ignatieff, 1999; Calhoun et al., 
2002). Most of these commentaries were premised on the 
assumption that the relationship between Realpolitik and 
human rights was a zero-sum game. In this essay we have 
demonstrated how the vicissitudes of the Human Rights 
Regime have become an integral part of politics, thus 
complicating such a dichotomous approach to human 
rights and politics. The contentious relation between the 
two, rather than being predicated on mutual exclusive-
ness, we suggest, is mediated by, among other factors, 
competing memories and different political situations. 
Given the immanent tension between the absolute and 
unconditional demands of human rights principles and 
the conditionality of politics, human rights activists, law-
yers and others perceive them as an absolutist framework 
whose principles admit no compromise. At the same time, 
it provides a set of standards against which all govern-
ments can be measured. It is precisely the prominence of 
human rights as a legitimating principle and the recogni-
tion that states frequently do not meet its requirements, 
that challenges the ongoing debate between so-called re-
alists and idealists among International Relations schol-
ars. As adherence (or lack thereof) to the Human Rights 
Regime confers legitimacy on states (or reduces it), poli-
tics and human rights seem less at odds then the realist-
idealist divide would suggest. Conversely, the absolute 
nature of human rights too can (and is) subjected to com-
promise and adjustments depending on particular politi-
cal requirements.
A prominent example for how human rights and poli-
tics are balanced emerges in the context of transitional 
justice. Here the question shifts from a quest for absolute 
justice to one in which states look for the best outcome 
possible at a given time and in light of available resourc-
es. With “best” being measured against the alternatives, 
and not in terms of how far they fall short of an absolute 
human rights conception. Here the unconditional nature 
of human rights is weighed against the requirement to 
provide peace and stability. This could be one of the fun-
damental reasons why successor governments and bu-
reaucracies are usually relying on some continuity and 
pre-existing elements. This last group must by definition 
be small or the operation cannot possibly be accom-
plished in a limited period of time. Thus, at times, amnes-
ties appear as the right political choice. Looking again at 
one of the defining examples, the de facto amnesty grant-
ed to Nazi officials after the war cannot possibly be 
squared with the demands of justice, and of course, al-
ways looms in the background of such processes. Again, 
this needs to be decided case by case. Adam Michnik and 
his fellow activists, who engendered the transformation 
in Poland, operated with the slogan “Amnesty Yes. Am-
nesia No” (Michnik and Havel, 1993). Current debates in 
Latin America about the acceptable balance of memory 
and prosecution are ultimately decided under the require-
ments of social and political stability. Conversely the de-
Bathification of Iraq has turned out to be a political liabil-
ity. Amnesties will always contain groups and members 
of the former regime that are seriously tainted in human 
rights terms. And this is also, where forgiveness as a po-
litical principle may come in. A human rights framework 
that knows no compromise or that sees any trade-off as a 
damnable dilution of its principles is completely unsuited 
to apply such a strategy. This is especially important in 
ethnic struggles all over the globe today. 
Ultimately we see how human rights principles can be 
subjected to particular requirements. Judging by the mul-
titude of experiences in different parts of the world, glob-
al discourse about forgiveness and human rights does not 
seem to be based on an absolute universalistic ethic. It is 
the product of negotiations with the respective other. 
Rwanda is a case in point. It shows that even an interna-
tionally established tribunal, such as the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, recognizes the need to ad-
just to local jurisprudence, as is evidenced in recognizing 
the decision of the Rwandan’s government to work to-
gether with civil society on the implementation of the in-
formal “gacaca” courts. In other words, it is not a univer-
sal morality, but instead we are witnesses to a global 
genesis of conditions of forgiveness that are shaped 
through the dialogue with the local. It is, often times, an 
ad-hoc conception of justice that incorporates a glo-
balized human rights culture into respective local and 
particular negotiations. 
A social theory of human rights, therefore, has to take 
into account the problem of the right mixture between 
what Max Weber called “Verantwortungsethik” (ethics of 
responsibility) and “Gesinnungsethik” (ethics of ultimate 
ends). Forgiveness might actually be a bridge between the 
two worlds of communal solidarity and universal human 
rights. Could it be that states after transitions will grant 
amnesties and forgive political criminals in the name of 
peace and stability? Should we allow these decisions to 
be overturned by an international tribunal? Here one fac-
es the fundamental Hobbesian situation, where civil 
peace is often more important than morality (human 
rights) – where it is often the only precondition that would 
make real morality possible. This is fundamentally the 
opposite perspective to that of an absolute framework of 
human rights, which essentially assumes civil peace can 
never be endangered by its activities –that any amount of 
mobilization, polarization and anathematization will nev-
er bring about a complete breakdown of the state but al-
ways only purify it. The ultimate reality of the situation is 
the need for peace– which means the realities of power. 
And this is why we need flexible principles, whose es-
sence is to find the best solution given the limits of the 
situation and the possibilities at any point of making 
things worse or not lasting. These principles are designed 
to lead to the best compromise. They are the right princi-
ples to guide our choices even when we are trying to 
reach humanitarian goals, i.e., a society in which people 
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live better, safer, freer, less fearful lives. They are the 
right principles to organize our thought on such matters. 
Human right principles, which are designed not to com-
promise, may be not. 
NOTES
1. The authors appear in alphabetical order. Please direct all corre-
spondence to Natan Sznaider (natan@mta.ac.il) at the Academic 
College of Tel-Aviv-Yaffo, Israel.
2. We are, of course, aware that the relevance of Holocaust memories 
are highly contingent. And as much as memories of the Holocaust 
are an attempt to articulate a foundational European moment, they 
have frequently operated as a divide between Western-Europe and 
Stalinist experiences behind the Iron Curtain. These politics of 
memory are persisting in the East. We address these politics of 
memory in a chapter entitled “East meets West: Europe and its 
Others” in our book Human Rights and Memory (2010). 
3. The proliferation of personal memoirs during the last two dec-
ades does not contradict this process, since for the most part these 
kinds of individual memories are now read (and written) within a 
broader framework of reconciliation. Especially retroactive ac-
counts tend to share narrative patterns with their counterparts in 
popular media. 
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